



Commander Naval Surface Force




**LtCol Paul Miner and Maj Bryan Delgado
COMNAVSURFOR
Combat Cargo**



Waterfront Chain of Command



- CNSF=CNSL+CNSP a single surface TYCOM
- Retirement of the Amphibious Groups
- Emergence of the Expeditionary Strike Groups
- Emergence of the Class Squadrons (CLASSRON)





Waterfront Accomplishments



- **COMNAVSURFOR INST 4621.1/COMMARFORCOMO 4621.1/COMMARFORPAC 4621.1B completed on and on the street. Combined three Instructions/directives into one.**
- **Assignment of MCC to new or changed units. Some MCCs still remain with DECOM SHIPS.**
- **MARFORPAC is now in step with MARFORCOM when it comes to paying for MOGAS onload/offload and disposal cost (different process).**
- **Getting the CLASSRON's staffed and running**



Waterfront Priorities



- **LFORM instruction; CNSF 4080 Series editing is now with the MARFORs. Input is due back to CNSF NLT 27 Jun 08.**
- **MWCP 4-11(Combat Cargo Handbook) and MWCP 3-31 (Amphibious Ships and Craft pub) are currently being reviewed and analyzed for republication.**
- **SPI Computer Fielding:**
 - **LOGAIS common capabilities suite for the PhibRon's and the Ships submitted to TDIS.**
 - **A set of vehicle wheel scales will accompany the computers for each big deck and potentially for each LPD (decision pending).**



Waterfront Priorities

cont..



- **Unauthorized ShipAlts:**
 - Changes have been proposed and some made to accommodate the ESG's and the MEU staffs.
- **Annual SLCP validation, reporting variances.**
- **C4I Baseline changes have a specific standards directed by HQMC; await Blue-Green approved all encompassing SCD.**
- **Bottom-line; Uniform capabilities across the classes of ships. Discipline needed in the Fleet Modernization Program. Ship Change Documents (SDC) should become the norm, not the exception.**



Waterfront Priorities

cont..



- **NAVY Staffs, NSE, and “other” units composition:**
- **Need to review ESG staff and NSE requirements and footprint of supporting personnel/equipment.**
- **NSE equipment requirements have changed with the Marine Corps over all expansion of equipment.**
- **Riverine Units and STUAS (RPV) Units may deploy with future ESG deployments. Need to capture EDLs and logistical requirements afloat (like MOGAS usage...) that may impact the Marine Corps.**
- **Bottom-line: We need a Navy Staff and NSE/Det base-line.**



Landing Force Equipment



Impact on the EFV Fleet



LVSR




MV22



JLTV
(16k)



USMC Aircraft and Vehicle Growth




Notional Aggregate (from above list) embarked MEU

Increased Weights/Density Impact Deck Strength, Ships Stability.

*Vehicle weights provided by MCCDC and POC 50 reps. Aircraft weights provided by NAVAIR reps




What that extra weight means...



POSITIVE STABILITY
With positive stability, a ship will right itself.

A High KG Results in Negative Stability...



NEGATIVE STABILITY
With negative stability, a ship will continue to roll over.



"Future Naval Operations"



“...the Naval and Marine Corps Operating Concepts call for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, preemption of non-traditional threats, and a global response to crisis in spite of challenges to access. Collectively, these concepts provide the foundation for selectively conducting either distributed or aggregated operations.”

-CMC Posture

Statement, March 2007

The Maritime Strategy “...must reflect the roles and missions we are expected to perform: in the war on terror, in conventional combat campaigns, in defense of the homeland, and in shaping and stability operations. It must strike a proper balance between the enduring requirements for traditional naval capabilities with those needed to squarely confront and influence the highly dynamic security environment of the 21st Century.”

-CNO Guidance for 2007, February

2007



Recent Applications of U.S. Amphibious Capability




101 in the past 25 years, covering the range of activities described in the national strategy.

❖ 88 conformed to the doctrinal types of amphibious operations:

- 6 Amphibious Assaults
- 4 Amphibious Withdrawals
- 3 Amphibious Demonstrations
- 2 Amphibious Raids
- 73 "Other Amphibious Operations" such as NEO (12) or HA/DR (26)

❖ 13 classified as "such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct"





Amphibious Ship Requirement




CCDR Shaping & Crisis Response

Capable of all Naval missions: 2.5+
MEU/ESG
4 X GFS
Enabled by MPF(F) / connectors

Forcible Entry

2 MEB assault echelon
30 Amphib Ships
Reinforced by one MEB
1 x (MPF (F))
Sufficient AFOE



- Stated Amphibious Ship requirement: 30 operationally available to support a 2 MEB (AE) forcible entry
- 33 Ships provide necessary maintenance inventory but fail to meet CCDR competing demands for shaping and crisis response
- Need to examine alternatives to mitigate risk in providing 30 ships for the AE. Examples:
 - Increase amphibious ship inventory or
 - Reevaluate MPF (F) to have GFS role



Waterfront Personnel Issues



CWO3 or CWO4 on big decks; too many CWO2's now.

CLASSRON staffing with experienced CCO's; both gapped now.

Staffing new ships ~4 months prior to delivery; we aren't making that now, troop spaces are suffering.

Too many "Ship to PhibRon" or "Ship to Ship" tours; need new blood/everyone needs to have a shot at a sea tour.

CCO/CCA formal training; none now and it shows.